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Connections between the sequentiality/concurrency distinction and the semantics of
proofs are investigated, with particular reference to games and Linear Logic.
1. Introduction
We use Games and Logic as a mirror to understand an aspect of the sequentiality/concurrency
distinction. We begin with the simple, intuitive notion of polarized games due to Blass
(Blass 1972; Blass 1992), which prefigured many of the ideas in Linear Logic (Girard 1987),
and which can be seen as a polarized version of ideas familiar from process calculi such
as CCS (Milner 1999) (synchronization trees, prefixing, summation, the Expansion the-
orem). We analyze the ‘shocking’ fact that this very clear and intuitive idea leads to
a non-associative composition; a kind of incompatibility between a purely sequential
model and logic in a classical format. Two ways of addressing this issue have been found.
One is to modify the syntax, by studying a ‘hyper-sequentialized’ version of sequent
calculus, in which the current focus of attention in the proof is explicitly represented.
This is the approach taken in Girard’s Ludics (Girard 2001). The other is to broaden
the notion of game to encompass ‘truly concurrent games’. In such games there is no
longer a global polarization (we can have positions in which both players can move
concurrently), although there are still local polarizations (each local decision is made
by just one of the players). This idea of concurrent games was used by Abramsky and
Mellie`s (Abramsky and Mellie`s 1999) to give a fully complete model for Linear Logic in
its original form (i.e. not ‘hyper-sequentialized’), and indeed the correspondence is with
proof-nets, the ‘parallel syntax for proof theory’ in Girard’s phrase (Girard 1995). In this
way, the distinction between sequentiality and concurrency is reflected at a fundamental
level, in the analysis of the ‘space of proofs’.
The main aim of the present paper is to expose some of the conceptual issues underlying
recent technical work on games and logic. The presentation is deliberately elementary in
style, in the hope of making the discussion accessible both to concurrency theorists, and
to those interested in the semantics of proofs—and of exhibiting a significant point of
contact betwen these two fields.
The analysis of Blass games and the problem of non-associativity of composition,
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and the connection of this issue to the interleaving/true concurrency distinction, were
first presented by the author in a lecture given at the Isaac Newton Institute for the
Mathematical Sciences at Cambridge in 1995, during the programme on Semantics of
Computation.
For the reader’s convenience, some material on Linear Logic (specifically, the sequent
calculus presentation of propositional Multiplicative-Additive Linear Logic (MALL)) is
recalled in an appendix.
Acknowledgement The comments made by the journal referees suggested a number of
improvements to the presentation.
2. Blass Games as Polarized Processes
In this section we will view games as polarized processes. More precisely, we will develop
a correspondence between certain 2-person games of perfect information and polarized
deterministic synchronization trees.
2.1. Review of notions from process theory
We can describe (well-founded) deterministic synchronization trees inductively, as given
by expressions of the form ∑
i∈I
ai.Pi (i 6= j ⇒ ai 6= aj)
i.e. as the least set closed under the operation of disjointly guarded summation (Milner 1989).
It is understood that the summation, as in CCS, is associative and commutative (idempo-
tence does not arise because of the disjointness condition). The basic case of the inductive
definition is given by the empty summation, written 0 (the ‘NIL’ process of CCS). There
are labelled transitions ∑
i∈I
ai.Pi
ai−→ Pi
for each i ∈ I, giving the arcs from the root of the synchronization tree to its immediate
sub-trees. See (Winskel and Nielsen 1995) for useful background on synchronization trees
and related models.
We could accomodate infinite branches in such trees by using a coinductive rather than
an inductive definition. This issue is not important for our purposes here, for which it
will be quite sufficient to consider only finite trees.
We can define interleaving (non-communicating) parallel composition on the synchro-
nization trees thus: if P =
∑
i∈I ai.Pi, and Q =
∑
j∈J bj .Qj, then
P‖Q =
∑
i∈I
ai.(Pi‖Q) +
∑
j∈J
bj.(P‖Qj).
(In order to preserve the disjointness property in the summation, we require that the
sorts of P and Q (i.e. the sets of labels appearing anywhere in the synchronization trees
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for P and Q respectively) are disjoint (Milner 1989)—this will be tacitly assumed in the
sequel.)
This is the Expansion Theorem (Milner 1989) in an appropriate version. Note that
it can be taken as an (inductive or coinductive) definition of parallel composition as
an operation on synchronization trees. It shows how to eliminate parallel composition in
favour of purely sequential constructs. As such, it expresses the essence of the interleaving
view of concurrency. Note that, in Milner’s classification of the operations of process
algebra (Milner 1989), guarded summation is built from the dynamic operations, while
parallel composition is the key static operation. So the interleaving view gives primacy
to the dynamic operations.
It will also be useful to recall the left merge operation, which is used extensively in
Process Algebra (Baeten and Weijland 1990). This has the defining equation
PTQ =
∑
i∈I
ai.(Pi‖Q)
where P =
∑
i∈I ai.Pi, and we can then express the Expansion Theorem by
P‖Q = PTQ+QTP.
This ‘biassed scheduling’ will also turn out to have its counterpart in Games and Linear
Logic.
2.2. Game Trees
We now consider game trees for 2-person games of perfect information. We will repre-
sent such games by polarized deterministic synchronization trees, i.e. by trees with one
‘bit’ of information added at each node to say which of the two player’s turn it is to
play at the game position corresponding to that node. We follow a standard practice of
referring to the two players as P (‘Proponent’) and O (‘Opponent’). In process terms, we
can think of P as representing the System currently under consideration, and O as its
Environment (see (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b) for a more detailed account of the
correspondence between notions of game theory and process theory).
Formally, we take games to be inductively (or, if preferred, coinductively) defined to
be either a product of games or a coproduct of games∏
i∈I
Gi or
∐
i∈I
Gi
where ∏
i∈I
Gi = (
∑
i∈I
i.Gi, O)
∐
i∈I
Gi = (
∑
i∈I
i.Gi, P )
(Since the identities of the ‘actions’ in the synchronization trees are irrelevant—they
just label the possible moves in each position of the game—we use the indices in the
summations themselves as the action names.)
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There are now two versions of the empty game tree: the empty product (0, O), and the
empty coproduct (0, P ).
Clearly, we can define a formal ‘game negation’ which inverts the polarization at each
node of the tree:
(
∑
i∈I
i.Gi, pi)
⊥ = (
∑
i∈I
i.G⊥i , p¯i)
where P¯ = O, O¯ = P. This immediately yields the equations
(
∏
i∈I Gi)
⊥ =
∐
i∈I G
⊥
i
(
∐
i∈I Gi)
⊥ =
∏
i∈I G
⊥
i
G⊥⊥ = G.
In Linear Logic, the product and coproduct are the additive level of connectives, with
the product written as & (With) and the coproduct as ⊕ (Plus). We see that in terms
of the game trees, these connectives are accounted for by the dynamic operations. What
about the static operations, in particular parallel composition? This has two polarized
versions, corresponding to the multiplicative connectives ⊗ (Tensor) and O (Par) of
Linear Logic.
2.3. Tensor
To define each of these binary connectives, we must consider four cases, corresponding
to the possible polarizations of their arguments.
For the Tensor, three of the four cases are forced by the requirement that Tensor should
distribute over coproduct. This can be taken as a desirable logical distributivity; more
mathematically, to support a good notion of implication, Tensor with either argument
fixed should be a left adjoint, giving rise e.g. to the adjunction
A⊗B −→ C
A −→ B⊸ C
and hence must preserve all colimits. In game terms, thinking of Tensor as a form of con-
junction, the onus is on P to defend both conjuncts, and hence P should move whenever
it is his term to move in either of the two “sub-games”. Thus we obtain the following
‘equations’ for the tensor:∐
i∈I Gi ⊗H =
∐
i∈I(Gi ⊗H)
G⊗
∐
j∈J Hj =
∐
j∈J (G⊗Hj)
As it stands, these equations are ambiguous, since they might both apply. We therefore
only apply them in the case where the term not appearing as a coproduct (i.e. H in the
first equation and G in the second) is labelled by O at the root (‘has negative polarity’).
To cover the final case, where both arguments to the tensor are coproducts, we write∐
i∈I
Gi ⊗
∐
j∈J
Hj =
∐
(i,j)∈I×J
(Gi ⊗Hj)
Here the right-hand side introduces the index set I × J , indicating that the initial move
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consists of P simultaneously moving in both sub-games. This is essentially the conven-
tion followed by Blass (Blass 1992). Alternatively, we might think of the moves being
performed in either order (an interleaving of the moves i and j). These representational
issues are not crucial here. What is important is the specification that P must move in
the tensor whenever it is his turn to move in either sub-game.
In process terms we can think of these cases as ‘biassed scheduling’, of the form of the
left merge operator studied in Process Algebra, with the bias determined by the polarity.
The final case to be considered is when the polarities of both the arguments to the
Tensor are O: and here we simply apply the exact analogue of the Expansion Theorem
for synchronization trees. If G =
∏
i∈I Gi, and H =
∏
j∈J Hj , then:
G⊗H =
∏
i∈I
(Gi ⊗H) ⊓
∏
j∈J
(G⊗Hj).
(Here we write ⊓ for binary product). In game terms, this says that O has the freedom
to move in either sub-game, which may then restore the situation to one in which P
will be forced to move; this is analogous (and indeed, formally related) to the ‘switching
conditions’ introduced in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b).
It is worth pointing out that this case, unlike the previous ones, is not logically (or
mathematically) forced by the wish to obtain a distributivity property or adjunction.
Rather, it is being enforced by the commitment in the setting we are currently considering
to a strictly sequential schedule of events, where it is always exactly one player’s turn
to move. Indeed, when we move to our concurrent form of games, we shall allow a wider
class of behaviours.
Another point worth making is that the third equation (both arguments coproducts)
can never be reached from one of the other cases. Whenever the polarities at the roots of
the two sub-games being considered are any of (O,P), (P,O) or (O,O), then any of the ini-
tial actions which may be performed lead to a residual pair of games whose root polarities
are again one of these three. For a discussion and proof of this, see (Abramsky 1997).
It may also be useful to give a ‘polarity table’ for the tensor, to show how the root of
a tensor game is labelled as a function of the labels of its subgames.
G H G⊗H
P P P
P O P
O P P
O O O
This can be compared to the truth-table for conjunction (reading O as true and P as
false), which appears to have been part of Blass’s original motivation for his definition
of the tensor.
A similar table appears in (Lamarche 1995) (with references to earlier work by Danos,
Regnier, Malacaria and Bellin), with the salient difference that the case for (O, O) is not
defined there. This reflects the fact that in that paper, it is really Intuitionistic Linear
Logic which is the object of study, and Classical Linear Logic is studied indirectly via a
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form of double-negation translation. This can be seen as a special case of the restrictions
imposed by the focussing version of Linear Logic, to be discussed in Section 6.
2.4. Par and Linear Implication
Given that we wish to have the De Morgan Duality
GOH = (G⊥ ⊗H⊥)⊥
and the equivalence
G⊸ H = G⊥OH
then the definitions of the other multiplicative connectives are forced by that of the
tensor: ∏
i∈I GiOH =
∏
i∈I(GiOH)
GO
∏
j∈J Hj =
∏
j∈J (GOHj)∏
i∈I GiO
∏
j∈J Hj =
∏
(i,j)∈I×J (GiOHj)
and if G =
∐
i∈I Gi, and H =
∐
j∈J Hj , then:
GOH =
∐
i∈I
(GiOH) ⊔
∐
j∈J
(GOHj).
(Here we write ⊔ for binary coproduct). The reader can similarly write down the definition
for the Linear Implication.
This notion of game tree, and the interpretations of the multiplicative and additive
connectives of Linear Logic, correspond exactly to the game semantics of Andreas Blass
(Blass 1992) (in the ‘relaxed form’ in his terminology). Note that the additives provide
the operations by which all such game trees can be constructed, and the multiplicatives
are ‘eliminated’ by the polarized versions of the Expansion Theorem given above. Hence
the additives have primacy in this form of game semantics, in exactly the same sense
that the dynamic operations have primacy in the interleaving view of process algebra.
These definitions are very clear and natural; indeed, they seem forced, given that the
interleaving point of view is being taken—as it is, implicitly at least, in the great bulk
of the tradition in Game Theory, which concerns game trees in which play proceeds in a
purely sequential fashion.
2.5. The second level: strategies
As we have seen, games add one crucial bit of structure to processes, namely the infor-
mation about whose turn it is to play at each position. This opens the way to allowing a
great deal of additional structure to be articulated explicitly. The usual process models
are rather amorphous; they allow a great variety of behaviours to be expressed easily,
but the structural characteristics of various classes of behaviour are hard to capture.
For example, processes are used to model both specifications and implementations:
both types, and the inhabitants of those types. In the world of games, one has the basic
distinction between games and strategies. If games are represented as trees, then one can
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naturally represent strategies for P or O for a game G as certain kinds of subtree of G.
From the point of view of process theory, both games and strategies are processes, but
we can use the distinction offered by the game setting to build a more structured theory.
We exemplify this by defining O- and P-strategies for Blass games. For simplicity we
shall consider only deterministic, total strategies for well-founded games, which have a
defined response in every position which can arise. For pi ∈ {P,O} we define Spi(G), the
strategies for pi on the game G, inductively by:
Spi(
∑
i∈I i.Gi, pi) = {i¯.σi | i ∈ I ∧ σi ∈ S
pi(Gi)} (I 6= ∅)
Spi(0, pi) = {0}
Spi(
∑
i∈I i.Gi, p¯i) = {
∑
i∈I i.σi | ∀i ∈ I. σi ∈ S
pi(Gi)}.
Thus a strategy for player pi on a game G is a sub-synchronization tree of G which
makes a deterministic choice of move at each position where pi is to play in G, and has
a response for every possible move by p¯i where it is p¯i’s turn. Note that, following CCS
(Milner 1989), we represent the player pi’s own moves by output actions i¯, and the moves
that pi ‘observes’ p¯i to make by input actions i.
Given σ ∈ SP (G), τ ∈ SO(G), we can define the result of playing σ off against τ to be
(σ | τ) \ S
using the CCS parallel composition and restriction operators (Milner 1989), where S
contains all the actions appearing in G. This will result in a uniquely determined silent
computation, which for well-founded G will end in an empty node (0, pi), where player
pi is to play but no move is possible. We decree that player pi loses that play; and can
then proceed to define the notion of winning strategy in the usual fashion. For non-well-
founded game trees, infinite plays are possible, and we must add information to say who
wins these. For more on this, see (Abramsky 1997), and for further development of the
connection between processes, games and Linear Logic, see (Abramsky 2000). We omit
a detailed discussion of these ideas, which are not needed for our purposes in this paper.
3. Composition
We now turn to the crucial issue of composition of strategies. It seems that, with our
simple but highly suggestive refinement from processes into Blass games, we have all the
necessary ingredients to make a full-blown model of Multiplicative-Additive Linear Logic
(MALL), at the level, not just of formulas, but of proofs. More precisely, we can see a
clear idea for how to define a category G based on games and strategies which can serve
as a model for MALL. The objects of G will be Blass games; a morphism from A to B
will be a strategy σ ∈ SP (A ⊸ B) = SP (A⊥OB). We have defined interpretations of
tensor product (A⊗B), par (AOB), negation (A⊥), products (
∏
i∈I Ai) and coproducts
(
∐
i∈I Ai) in this category. This is all so natural that one might take it for granted that
the details must all work out.
However, there is a snag, of a rather fundamental kind. Moreover, this problem arises
precisely from the polarization structure we have imposed on the Linear connectives, and
hence from the interleaving view of concurrency on which, implicitly, it is based.
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The problem concerns associativity of composition. It was known to Andreas Blass
(Blass 1993), although not mentioned in his papers on Game Semantics. It was noticed
independently and discussed in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b).
To analyze associativity, we should consider strategies
σ : A→ B τ : B → C θ : C → D
which we can view as
σ : A⊥OB τ : B⊥OC θ : C⊥OD.
Each of the games A, B, C, D can have either P or O polarity at the root, yielding 16
possibilities. Of these, just one is problematic, namely when:
— A, C have polarity O
— B, D have polarity P.
In this case, A⊥ has polarity P, so in the game A⊥OB we are in the case of the Expansion
Theorem for Par, and P has the choice of playing in either A⊥ or B. Suppose that σ in
fact chooses to play in A⊥. Similarly, C⊥ has polarity P, so in the game C⊥OD, P has
the choice of playing in either C⊥ or D. Suppose that θ in fact chooses to play in D. Now
in B⊥OC, O must play first. Suppose that we first form the composition σ; τ : A⊥OC.
Then again O is to play first in this game. If we now form the composition
(σ; τ); θ : A⊥OD,
then since P is to play first, the only possibility is that the first move is that of θ,
which is made in D. Now reasoning in an entirely similarly fashion, if we first form the
composition τ ; θ, this must first wait for O to move, while σ; (τ ; θ) must begin with a
move by P, which must then be made by σ, and hence must be made in A⊥. We therefore
conclude that:
— (σ; τ); θ plays initially in D
— σ; (τ ; θ) plays initially in A⊥
and hence (σ; τ); θ 6= σ; (τ ; θ).
This argument is very robust, and assumes very little about the specifics of how strate-
gies are defined. It is based on the way that polarization is enforced in the definition of
the multiplicative connectives in Blass games. As we have seen, that enforcement of
polarization is rather directly related to the interleaving interpretation of concurrency.
What of the other 15 possible polarizations of A, B, C, D? We can see fairly easily
that none of them give rise to an analogous problem. Indeed, in 12 of these cases, O is
to move first in A⊥OD; while in the three remaining cases, one of the three strategies σ,
τ or θ must unambiguously move first as forced by the polarization, whichever way the
composition is bracketed. We list the possibilities explicitly in Table 1.
4. Syntactic Perspective
To show how easily the problem we described in the previous section can arise in MALL,
we shall give a simple example of a proof in MALL whose interpretation in Blass games
gives rise to exactly this situation.
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A B C D initial move by
0 O O O O O
1 O O O P θ
2 O O P O O
3 O O P P τ
4 O P O O O
5 O P O P ?
6 O P P O O
7 O P P P σ
8 P O O O O
9 P O O P O
10 P O P O O
11 P O P P O
12 P P O O O
13 P P O P O
14 P P P O O
15 P P P P O
Table 1. How polarities determine the initial move
Firstly, let α be a propositional atom. We define A, B, C and D to be the following
formulas:
A = C = α&α, B = D = α⊕ α.
Note that these formulas have exactly the polarities of the problematic case discussed
in the previous section (remembering that & is product and ⊕ is coproduct). We define
three proofs.
Π1 :
α⊥, α
Id
α⊥, α⊕ α
⊕R
α⊥ ⊕ α⊥, α⊕ α
⊕R
Π2 :
α⊥, α
Id
α⊥, α
Id
α⊥&α⊥, α
&
α⊥, α
Id
α⊥, α
Id
α⊥&α⊥, α
&
α⊥&α⊥, α&α
&
Π3 :
α⊥, α
Id
α⊥ ⊕ α⊥, α
⊕R
α⊥ ⊕ α⊥, α⊕ α
⊕R
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The interpretation of these proofs as strategies σ, τ , θ gives rise to exactly the prob-
lematic situation described in the previous section. The relationship between the form of
the sequent calculus proofs and the temporal properties of strategies (where do we move
first?) is that
the last rule of a proof corresponds to the first move in the associated strategy.
Thus the first proof above, Π1, indeed ‘moves’ first in A
⊥, while the third proof Π3 moves
first in D. On the other hand, rules introducing connectives of negative polarity, such as
&, correspond to O-moves; so we see that in the second proof, Π2, O is to move first.
Now we can consider the two ways of composing these proofs using cuts:
Π1....
A⊥, B
Π2....
B⊥, C
A⊥, C
Cut
Π3....
C⊥, D
A⊥, D
Cut
Π1....
A⊥, B
Π2....
B⊥, C
Π3....
C⊥, D
B⊥, D
Cut
A⊥, D
Cut
corresponding to (σ; τ); θ and σ; (τ ; θ) respectively. Performing cut-elimination on these
two proofs leads to Π3 and Π1 repectively. These two proofs can be considered equal up
to permutation of rules. The ‘rigid’ sequential interpretation of proofs as strategies does
not satisfy this equality, and hence distinguishes the two proofs.
The analogy we wish to make is again with concurrency theory. The two proofs differ
in the order in which they introduce the two occurences of ⊕ in the sequent α⊥ ⊕
α⊥, α⊕ α. Computationally, each of these introduction rules amounts to specifying one
bit of information (are we in the left disjunct or the right disjunct?), so that we can see
the roˆle of these two introduction rules in the proof as like performing two ‘actions’, say:
— a: set the boolean variable B1
— b: set the boolean variable B2.
From the sequential, interleaving point of view, we must distinguish between the com-
putation histories ab and ba, taking account of the order in which the ‘events’ a and b
occur. In a true concurrency model, if the events a and b are causally independent of
each other, we can identify these two histories (Winskel and Nielsen 1995).
The purpose of proof nets (Girard 1987; Girard 1995) and Geometry of Interaction
(Girard 1989; Girard 1990; Girard 1995; Danos and Regnier 1993; Danos and Regnier 1995)
was to find a more intrinsic representation of proofs in which the spurious ordering of
rules imposed by sequent calculus was factored out. This is directly akin to the issue of
representing true concurrency; and we can indeed see proof nets as a ‘parallel syntax for
proof theory’ (Girard 1995).
We conclude this section by remarking that the syntactic example we have discussed
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above can be linked directly to the general analysis of the associativity problem for Blass
games given in the previous section. One simply has to spell out the interpretation of the
three proofs Π1, Π2, Π3 as strategies σ1, σ2, σ3 for the corresponding Blass games, and
observe that
σ1; (σ2;σ3) 6= (σ1;σ2);σ3.
Exactly this is done in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b). We prefer not to repeat it
here since we have not given a formal definition of composition of strategies for Blass
games.
5. Discussion
It is useful to compare the issue we have raised in connection with Classical Linear Logic
with a familiar issue in the proof theory of Classical Logic. There is a well known incom-
patibility between unconstrained Classical Logic proof theory and confluence, as shown
very clearly and simply by a well-known example due to Yves Lafont (Girard et al. 1989).
In our view, the example we have discussed shows equally clearly the incompatibility
between unconstrained Classical Linear Logic proof theory and a purely sequential, in-
terleaving view of the semantics of proofs.
There seem to be two approaches to the computational interpretation of proofs in
Classical Logic.
1 ‘Tame’ the syntax, by restricting the permitted reductions, or by adding informa-
tion to resolve the non-deterministic choices, and hence restoring confluence. This
approach is typified by systems such as Girard’s LC (Girard 1991), the systems LKT
and LKQ of Danos, Joinet and Schellinx (Danos et al. 1996), and the λµ-calculus of
Parigot (Parigot 1992).
2 Study the full, ‘untamed’ non-confluent calculus, and find the computational struc-
ture which is there. This is typified by work such as (Barbanera and Berardi 1996;
Urban 2000; Laird 2001).
In a similar fashion, there seem to be two possibilities for studying Linear Logic proofs.
1 Taming the syntax, in such a way as to control the scheduling, and to avoid the ‘bad’
combination of polarities which led to the problem with composition. Most game
semantics applies to the Intuitionistic version of Linear Logic—indeed much of it
applies only to the negative fragment (Abramsky 1997). In game terms, this means
that one only considers games in which Opponent starts, and in which the players
strictly alternate. Under these constraints, no problems with composition arise. What
is lost is any direct access to the natural game interpretation of classical (Linear)
negation, by interchange of roˆles between the players. However, it should be noted
that these kind of games are quite sufficient to yield good models of the λµ-calculus,
as shown e.g. in (Ong 1996; Laird 1999).
But this is not the only option. One can go beyond the scope of Intuitionistic Linear
Logic, and study a more expressive, yet still ‘tamed’ system of Linear Logic. This is
Linear Logic with focussing, as introduced by Andreoli (Andreoli and Pareschi 1991),
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and used in the current work by Girard on Ludics (Girard 2001). We shall study this
approach in the next section.
2 Alternatively, we can extend the semantics to embrace true concurrency, and hence
overcome the problems with composition while still interpreting the full, uncon-
strained original syntax of Linear Logic. This is what is done in the concurrent games
model, which we shall discuss in Section 7.
6. The sequential way out: Focussing
We shall consider the focussing version of MALL used in (Girard 2001), and based on
the system introduced in (Andreoli and Pareschi 1991). We shall refer to this system as
MALLfoc. We shall only use the propositional part of the system, which we recapitulate
here for the reader’s convenience.
Firstly, the formulas of the system are positive formulas P , Q . . . , built from proposi-
tional atoms α, β, . . . by the grammar
P ::= α | ↓P⊥ | P ⊕ P | P ⊗ P.
Here ↓P⊥ is the ‘shifted negation’ of P , in which the shift is used to restore positive po-
larity. One can think of this as a kind of double negation interpretation: in game/process
terms, it is polarized prefixing, in which the polarity is reversed at each node of the game
for P (as in Linear negation), but then positive polarity is restored by prefixing with a
‘dummy’ P-move.
A sequent in MALLfoc is an expression Γ ⊢ ∆;Σ, where Γ, ∆, Σ are finite multisets of
formulas, with the following stoup constraint :
If the stoup Σ is non-empty, then it contains exactly one formula; moreover, in this
case Γ consists only of propositional atoms.
Negative propositions are handled implicitly through the left hand sides of sequents.
The rules of MALLfoc are as follows.
Cut
Γ ⊢ ∆;P Γ′, P ⊢ ∆′;
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′;
;Cut
Γ ⊢ ∆, P ; Γ′, P ⊢ ∆′;
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′;
Cut;
Identity
α ⊢;α
Id
Focussing
Γ ⊢ ∆;P
Γ ⊢ ∆, P ;
Foc
Shift
Γ, P ⊢ ∆;
Γ ⊢ ∆; ↓P⊥
⊢↓
Γ ⊢ ∆, P ;
Γ, ↓P⊥ ⊢ ∆;
↓⊢
Tensor
Γ ⊢ ∆;P Γ′ ⊢ ∆′;Q
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′;P ⊗Q
⊢⊗
Γ, P,Q ⊢ ∆;
Γ, P ⊗Q ⊢ ∆;
⊗⊢
Sequentiality vs. Concurrency in Games and Logic 13
Plus
Γ ⊢ ∆;P
Γ ⊢ ∆;P ⊕Q
⊢⊕l
Γ ⊢ ∆;Q
Γ ⊢ ∆;P ⊕Q
⊢⊕r
Γ, P ⊢ ∆; Γ, Q ⊢ ∆;
Γ, P ⊕Q ⊢ ∆;
⊕⊢
Note that the stoup represents the “focus of attention” for positive rules (i.e. for P-
moves). The stoup constraint enforces an explicit scheduling, in the sense that, if the
stoup is non-empty, then the only rules which can be applied (backwards, i.e. in the
sense of proof search) apply to the stoup formula. On the other hand, if the stoup is
empty, we must apply negative rules to formulas on the left-hand side of the sequent.
So along each branch of a partial proof tree developed in proof search we observe an
alternation between a sequence of P-moves (corresponding to applying rules to the stoup
formula) and O-moves (when the stoup is empty and we apply negative rules). Positive
rules are applied until we hit a shift in the stoup formula, at which point the stoup is
emptied, and the formula transferred (with reversed polarity) to the left-hand side of the
sequent, so that it is now “O’s turn”. In the opposite direction, O moves as long as it
can, and then transfers control back to P when all the formulas on the left-hand side
are atoms. P can then refill the stoup using the focussing rule, and proceed. Thus we
see that in this system, the scheduling of whose turn it is to move next is completely
deterministic, and all actions can be performed in a purely sequential fashion.
We now ask: to what extent can the problematic situation in standard MALL involving
the proofs Π1, Π2, Π3 which we discussed in section 4 be replicated in MALLfoc?
If we begin with Π1, we can certainly find a reasonable analogue Π
′
1:
α ⊢;α
Id
α ⊢;α⊕ α
⊢⊕r
α ⊢ α⊕ α;
Foc
⊢ α⊕ α; ↓α⊥
⊢↓
⊢ α⊕ α; ↓α⊥ ⊕ α
⊢⊕r
⊢ ↓α⊥ ⊕ α, α⊕ α;
Foc
This has the essential feature that the last positive rule is applied to the left hand formula
in the final sequent, which will not participate in the Cut with (the analogue of) Π2.
Now we must find an analogue of Π2. This is harder work, and we must use the ‘double
negation’ style representation of α&α as ↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥. We then obtain Π′2:
α ⊢;α
Id
α ⊢ α;
Foc
α, ↓α⊥ ⊢;
↓⊢
α ⊢;α
Id
α ⊢ α;
Foc
α, ↓α⊥ ⊢;
↓⊢
α, ↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥ ⊢;
⊕⊢
α ⊢; ↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥
⊢↓
α ⊢ ↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥;
Foc
α ⊢;α
Id
α ⊢ α;
Foc
α, ↓α⊥ ⊢;
↓⊢
α ⊢;α
Id
α ⊢ α;
Foc
α, ↓α⊥ ⊢;
↓⊢
α, ↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥ ⊢;
⊕⊢
α ⊢; ↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥
⊢↓
α ⊢ ↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥;
Foc
α⊕ α ⊢ ↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥;
⊕⊢
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Note that Π2 introduces first the left-hand &, then the right-hand &. Π2 is clearly
equivalent by permutation of rules to the MALL proof which introduces the two &’s in
the opposite order. There is an analogous version of Π′2 which introduces the two ⊕’s
in the opposite order. However, whereas Π2 is essentially completely symmetric between
the two &’s, in the case of Π′2 there is an evident asymmetry between the left-hand &,
which is represented implicitly by the ⊕ on the left-hand side of the sequent, and the
right-hand &, which is represented in ‘double-negation’ form as ↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥ on the
right-hand side of the sequent. This asymmetry makes a telling difference as regards the
possibilities for forming cuts, as we shall now see.
We now need an analogue of Π3. This should be a proof of a sequent
↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥ ⊢ A⊕B;
in which the last positive rule is the one introducing the ⊕ in the right-hand side of
the sequent. This leads to the following proof Π′3, in which we take A = ↓(↓α
⊥)⊥—this
‘double negation’ is essential.
α ⊢;α
Id
α ⊢ α;
Foc
⊢ α; ↓α⊥
⊢↓
⊢ α; ↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥
⊢⊕l
⊢ α, ↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥;
Foc
↓α⊥ ⊢ ↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥;
↓⊢
⊢ ↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥; ↓(↓α⊥)⊥
⊢↓
⊢ ↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥; ↓(↓α⊥)⊥ ⊕B
⊢⊕l
⊢ ↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥, ↓(↓α⊥)⊥ ⊕B;
Foc
↓(↓α⊥ ⊕ ↓α⊥)⊥ ⊢ ↓(↓α⊥)⊥ ⊕B;
↓⊢
Note the necessity to double-negate α in order to allow the ⊕ which will end up on
the left-hand side of the sequent to be introduced. Note also that, crucially, because of
the stoup constraint we cannot perform the ⊕-introduction on the right hand side of the
sequent as the last rule in the proof. This means that what we actually obtain combining
Π′1, Π
′
2, Π
′
3 is the analogous situation to case 7 in Table 1. If we worked in symmetric
fashion from right to left, we would obtain a situation analogous to case 1. However, no
analogue of the problematic case 5 can be found in MALLfoc.
Although we have only considered a particular example, it should illustrate the way
in which MALLfoc tames MALL by putting sufficient constraints on the control flow so
that it admits a deterministic, sequential scheduling.
It is precisely for this reason that MALLfoc is used in the work on Ludics. While
Ludics is a much richer and more subtle setting than Blass games, it does have certain
salient features in common. These include the primacy of the additives, and also the fact
that interaction in Ludics is strictly polarized; in fact, the two players strictly alternate,
although either player can start. In Ludics, control is retained over the scheduling by
explicit use of the shift operators (which in process terms can be seen as polarized versions
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of prefixing). So Ludics as a semantic universe corresponds to (and was in some sense
inspired by) the focussing version of MALL, and it is for MALLfoc that a full completeness
result is proved for Ludics in (Girard 2001).
In fact, once one restricts attention to Linear Logic with Focussing, or to the equivalent
system LLp of polarized Linear Logic (Laurent et al. 2000), then more or less any form of
sequential games can be used to interpret the system without any problems of the kind
encountered with the full Classical system in section 3. Indeed, Laurent has given a fully
complete model for LLp using Hyland-Ong style games (Laurent 2001).
7. The concurrent way out: Concurrent Games
When confronted with a mismatch between syntax and semantics, one may:
— modify the syntax, or
— change the model.
Thus in the case of PCF, confronted with the non full abstraction of the standard deno-
tational model, one may extend PCF with parallel constructs, or look for a more refined
model which captures sequentiality. In the case of Linear Logic, the movement is rather in
the opposite direction: starting from a sequential model, we can either constrain the syn-
tax to enforce sequentiality, or enrich the model to allow concurrency to be represented
directly. We now turn to this latter possibility.
Neither game theory nor concurrency theory offers ready made solutions to this prob-
lem. While some suggestive remarks connecting games of imperfect information with
concurrent ‘teams’ of players have been made (Hintikka and Sandu 1995), no precise, let
alone tractable formalization has been proposed so far as we are aware.
As we have seen, Blass games give primacy to the additive connectives of Linear Logic.
They give a direct and natural representation of the idea that (occurrences of) & and
⊕ represent points in the computation at which choices have to be made. In the case
of &, the choice is made by O, in the case of ⊕, by P. However, the account given of
the multiplicative connectives in these games is less satisfactory, as we have seen: the
insistence on retaining a global polarization, so that in each position it is exactly one
player’s turn to move, leads to over-specification of the sequential order of events, with
bad formal consequences.
By contrast, we find an ‘authentic’ semantic account of the multiplicatives (and, to
some extent, of the exponentials) in the Geometry of Interaction (Girard 1989; Girard 1990;
Girard 1995; Danos and Regnier 1993; Danos and Regnier 1995). Here the ‘local, asyn-
chronous’ character of the multiplicatives, suggested by the intrinsic, geometrical repre-
sentation of multiplicative proofs as proof nets, is turned into a concrete form of symbolic
dynamics. The basic idea of Geometry of Interaction is that multiplicative proofs are rep-
resented by permutations acting on structures of some kind.
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7.1. Background
The original version of the Geometry of Interaction was developed by Girard for the
multiplicative fragment (Girard 1988). This is still the best setting in which to explain
the basic ideas on which the interpretation is based.
Consider then the multiplicative fragment, with the restriction that the Axiom is only
used for propositional atoms, α⊥, α. Now, if we look at the cut-free proofs, for example
of α ⊗ α ⊸ α ⊗ α, i.e. of the sequent α⊥Oα⊥, α ⊗ α, there are in fact just two,
corresponding to the identity and twist maps.
✜
✜
✜
❏
❏
❏
✜
✜
✜
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
✜
✜
✜
❏
❏
❏
✜
✜
✜
TwistId
αα
α⊗ α
α⊥α⊥
α⊥Oα⊥ α⊥Oα⊥
α⊥ α⊥
α⊗ α
α α
As we see from these examples, cut-free proof nets in this fragment have the structure
of a set of trees, one for each formula in the conclusion, with the leaves connected up in
pairs by the axiom links. Moreover, the structure of the trees is determined uniquely by
the formulae in the sequent (this is where the restriction on axioms is applied). Hence, a
complete invariant to distinguish the different cut-free proofs of a given sequent is given
by the information as to how the leaves are joined up.
TwistId
We can model this information by a permutation on the set of leaves obtained as the
product of the transpositions corresponding to the axiom links. Thus,
dcba
corresponds to the permutation (
a b c d
c d a b
)
Note that these transpositions are disjoint. So, a cut-free proof is represented by an in-
volution, i.e. a self-inverse permutation. This representation of cut-free proofs can be
thought of as modelling the ‘information flow’ between the leaves in a dynamic fashion;
think of tokens travelling in both directions across the axiom links, as opposed to mod-
elling the linkage statically by a graph. Note that we are using functions to represent
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this information flow, but without input-output bias, since the flow is bidirectional and
symmetric.
Returning to our example, consider performing cut-elimination on twist ◦ twist: The
proof net for twist ◦ twist before cut elimination is:
❅
❅
❅ 
 
  ❅
❅
❅ 
 
 ❅
❅
❅ 
 
 ❅
❅
❅ 
 
 
α⊥Oα⊥ α⊗ α α⊥Oα⊥ α⊗ α
α⊥ α⊥ α α α⊥ α⊥α α
The proof net for twist ◦ twist after one step of cut elimination is:
❅
❅❅ 
   ❅❅❅ 
  
ααα⊥α⊥ααα⊥α⊥
α⊗ ααOα
Generally, in this fragment, we can apply this ‘decomposition rule’ repeatedly for tensors
cut against par until all cuts are between axiom links. We can say that the whole purpose
of these transformations is to match up the corresponding axiom links correctly; the ‘real’
information flow is then accomplished by the axiom reductions:
✲α⊥ α α⊥ α α⊥ α
or more generally,
✲α⊥ α α⊥ α α⊥ α α⊥ α
The idea, as with cut-free proofs, is to model these transformations dynamically, by the
flow of information tokens, rather than by graph rewriting.
An interpretation of the multiplicative fragment can be given using just permutations
on finite sets, as described in (Girard 1988). The task of characterizing the space of proofs
is then to pick out exactly those permutations which can arise as the denotation of (cut-
free) proof nets, and moreover to do so in a compositional, syntax-free fashion. This is the
goal of full completeness theorems, to be discussed in the next section. The main point to
note for now is that this can indeed be done using suitable uniformity and preservation
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properties in a number of semantic settings; this is the content of the various full com-
pleteness theorems for Multiplicative Linear Logic which have appeared over the past few
years, starting with (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b) (see e.g. (Hyland and Ong 1992;
Blute and Scott 1996; Loader 1994a; Haghverdi 2000)).
The question is, how can this view of the multiplicatives, which has no scope for
expressing causal dependencies (this is exactly the sense in which it is asynchronous) be
reconciled with the additives, which as we have seen are essentially concerned with choice
and causality?†
We can in fact characterize the behavioural features of the various levels of connectives
in Linear Logic using the concepts of Net Theory (Petri 1977):
— the multiplicatives express concurrency (i.e. pure causal independence)
— the additives express conflict and causality (i.e. choice and sequencing).
(This is of course just the ‘true concurrency’ perspective on our previous alignment of the
additives with the dynamic operations of process algebra, and the multiplicatives with
the static operations.) What we are looking for is a setting in which all these features
can be represented.
Of course, Net Theory itself offers such a setting. The problem with using Net Theory as
a formal basis for our semantic representation is that, as we have seen, we need two levels
of description: the formulas and the proofs (or: the games and the strategies). While it
was a relatively simple matter to describe strategies as subtrees of synchronization trees,
it does not seem to be so easy to find a good, tractable description of strategies over
games represented as Petri Nets. For this reason, we shall pursue a different approach.
In keeping with the discussion so far, we are looking for a semantic representation such
that both:
— the account of the additives given in Blass games, and
— the account of the multiplicatives given in Geometry of Interaction
can be faithfully represented. By being a little more abstract, an elegant account meeting
all these desiderata can be found.
7.2. A domain-theoretic formalization of games and strategies
Let us begin by revisiting Blass games, with the idea that game trees can be viewed
as partial orders, in which x ≤ y means that the position y can be reached from the
position x by playing some additional moves. This is a natural “information ordering”
as in Domain theory (Abramsky and Jung 1994); it is the prefix ordering on the plays
or paths through the game tree. If we add “limit points” corresponding to the infinite
branches in the game tree, we obtain a complete partial order D.
Viewed in these terms, the construction of sums and products of games as in Blass
games can be described as lifted sums as far as the underlying domains of positions are
† The extension of Geometry of Interaction to the additives in (Girard 1995), while containing much of
interest, is generally agreed not to offer a fully satisfactory treatment.
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concerned:
D(
∐
i∈I
Ai) = D(
∏
i∈I
Ai) = (
⊎
i∈I
D(Ai))⊥.
Here
⊎
i∈I Di is the disjoint union of the partial orders Di; while D⊥ is the lift of D,
i.e. the result of adding a new bottom element to D. It is important to understand that
this partial order representation is entirely equivalent to that given using deterministic
synchronization trees in Section 2. The root of the game tree for G is represented by the
bottom element of D(G), corresponding to the position in which no moves have yet been
played. The elements of D(G) immediately above ⊥D will be of the form ini(⊥i), where
⊥i is the bottom element of Gi. Such an element corresponds to the position where the
opening move i has been made, and we are now at the root of the sub-tree Gi. As we go
up in the ordering, this will correspond to the further development of the play.
Importantly, the partial order representation of game trees admits an elegant repre-
sentation of strategies, as functions on these domains of positions: f : D → D, where
f(x) is the position obtained from x by extending it with whatever moves the strategy
makes in that position. It is then immediate that f(x) ⊒ x. Moreover, those positions
where f has no moves to make (e.g. because ‘it is not its turn’) are exactly the fixpoints
of f . In the usual way, we require computationally reasonable strategies to be monotonic
and continuous. Finally, as a useful normalizing condition, we require strategies to be
idempotent : f2 = f . To understand this, consider f applied to f(x). The only moves
made in f(x) which were not already made in x are those made by f itself: f(x) contains
no more information supplied by the Opponent (i.e. the environment) than x did. Hence
anything f decides to do at f(x) it should have already been able to decide to do at x,
and we require that f(f(x)) = f(x). Of course, this allows several moves to be made in
a block by a player. This possibility already exists in Blass games, e.g. Opponent must
move twice initially in any game of the form
(A ⊓B) ⊓ (C ⊓D),
(first to resolve the choice between (A⊓B) and (C ⊓D), then to resolve the initial choice
offered in the chosen sub-game). An important point is that strategies may not be well-
defined at all positions. In general there are some positions that can never be reached
by following that strategy. To mesh with the requirement that strategies are increasing
functions, we adjoin a top element to the domain of positions D, writing this as D⊤. We
represent f being undefined at x by f(x) = ⊤. Note that in this context ⊤ is really being
used to represent undefinedness or partiality of the closure operator, i.e. divergence. On
the other hand, being stuck at a (non-maximal) fixpoint can be userstood as deadlock.
Thus a natural distinction appears in this setting between deadlock and divergence.
We recall that a closure operator on a partial order is an idempotent, increasing,
monotone endofunction. So our discussion can be summarized by saying that strategies
(for either player) are represented as continuous closure operators on D⊤, which under
modest assumptions on D (bounded completeness) is a complete lattice.
Notation We write σ : D⊤ to signify that σ is a continuous closure on D⊤.
We can completely specify a game as a structure (D,SP , SO), where D is the domain
S. Abramsky 20
of positions, SP is the set of legal strategies for P, and SO is the set of legal counter-
strategies, i.e. strategies for O.
Remark We remark in passing that closure operators have been used to give a denota-
tional semantics to (deterministic) concurrent constraint programming (Saraswat et al. 1991).
The basic dynamics of this model is very much akin to what we are doing here, just as the
basic dynamics of process calculi is akin to the structure of sequential games. The added
ingredient in each case is the extra structure implied by distinguishing explicitly between
System and Environment, and imposing a typed framework by distinguishing between
the game and the strategy. In the work on concurrent constraint programming, closure
operators are studied in terms of their sets of fixpoints. This is very convenient from a
denotational point of view, but if the dynamics are being studied, then the properties of
the closures qua functions are significant, and we prefer to study them in these terms.
We can define the strategies for either player inductively on (well-founded) Blass games,
just as we did using the synchronization tree representation. For products, we define
SP (
∏
i∈I
Ai) = {〈σi|i ∈ I〉 | ∀i ∈ I. σi ∈ S
P (Ai)}
where
〈σi|i ∈ I〉(⊥) = ⊥
〈σi|i ∈ I〉(ini(x)) = ini(σi(x)).
This corresponds exactly to the idea that Player must first wait for Opponent to choose
an i ∈ I, and then plays according to some strategy for Ai.
SP (
∐
i∈I
Ai) = {ini(σ) | i ∈ I ∧ σ ∈ S
P (Ai)}
where
ini(σ)(⊥) = ini(σ(⊥))
ini(σ)(ini(x)) = ini(σ(x))
ini(σ)(inj(x)) = ⊤, (i 6= j).
Again, this corresponds to the idea that a strategy for Opponent will firstly choose some
i, then play according to a strategy for Opponent in Ai. Note that the last case above
covers ‘unreachable states’ for ini(σ).
We can also define the duality directly in terms of its effect on the set of strategies for
either player: the reversal of roˆles means that strategies for P turn into strategies for O,
and vice versa:
(D,SP , SO)⊥ = (D,SO, SP ).
Clearly with this definition G⊥⊥ = G. Also, we define SO(G) = SP (G⊥).
For the case of well-founded Blass games, we recover exactly the same class of strategies
as in our earlier definition in terms of synchronization trees. For such games, D is the
domain of finite and infinite sequences under the prefix ordering corresponding to the
paths through the game tree, and the conventions about who is to play are captured by
the fact that, for all x ∈ D, either σ(x) = x for all σ ∈ SP (it is Opponent’s turn to
move), or τ(x) = x for all τ ∈ SO (it is Player’s turn). However, this is a very special case
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of our general setting; and we will overcome the problems with Blass games precisely by
allowing situations in which both players can move.
To do this, we shall interpret the game boards for the multiplicatives differently to
Blass: by a true concurrency rather than an interleaving representation. In our setting,
this is simply a matter of defining
D(A⊗B) = D(AOB) = D(A) ×D(B),
the cartesian product of domains. It is important to understand how this relates to
our earlier discussion of true concurrency. A typical situation in which there are two
causally independent events a and b might be represented by a game D × E, where say
a corresponds to the increase in information ⊥ ⊑ d in D, while b is represented by the
increase in information ⊥ ⊑ e in E. Then the performance of these two actions in either
order
(⊥,⊥) ⊑ (d,⊥) ⊑ (d, e)
corresponding to the trace ab, or
(⊥,⊥) ⊑ (⊥, e) ⊑ (d, e)
corresponding to ba, will indeed be identified, with the single outcome (d, e). Indeed,
cartesian product of event structures is standardly used to model parallel composition in
‘partial order’ or ‘true concurrency’ semantics (Winskel and Nielsen 1995).
For the strategies for tensor, we define
SP (A⊗B) = {σ × τ | σ ∈ SP (A) ∧ τ ∈ SP (B)}
where σ×τ(x, y) = (σ(x), τ(y)). (This is really smash product with respect to ⊤; if either
σ(x) = ⊤ or τ(y) = ⊤, then the result is ⊤.) This exactly captures the idea of informa-
tional independence between Player’s actions in A and inB (cf. (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b)).
How Player moves in A depends only on the information available in A, and similarly
for B.
In order to define the counter-strategies for the Tensor (and hence the strategies for
Par and Linear implication, and eventually the morphisms in the category of concurrent
games), we introduce the most important feature of our formalization: the elegant treat-
ment it affords of composition of strategies. Suppose firstly that σ ∈ SP and τ ∈ SO in
a game (D,SP , SO). How do we play σ off against τ? We define
〈σ|τ〉 = Y(σ ◦ τ) =
∨
k∈ω(σ ◦ τ)
k(⊥)
=
∨
k∈ω(τ ◦ σ)
k(⊥) = Y(τ ◦ σ).
The fact that these two least fixpoints coincide follows easily from the fact that σ and
τ are continuous and increasing; in particular, this is a special case of the construction
of the join of two closure operators. Thus 〈σ|τ〉 ∈ D is the position we reach as a result
of playing σ against τ . The equality of the two formulas above also shows that this is
independent of all questions about ‘who starts’.
Now given closure operators σ on (D×E)⊤ and τ on (E×F )⊤, we want to ‘compose’
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them to get a closure σ; τ on (D × F )⊤. We define this as follows:
σ; τ(x, z) = (pi1 ◦ σ(x, y), pi2 ◦ τ(y, z))
where
y = 〈pi2 ◦ σ(x,−)|pi1 ◦ τ(−, z)〉.
That is, given input in D and F , we play σ and τ off against each other in E relative to
this input, and obtain their external response taking into account their interaction with
each other.
In particular, if σ is a closure on (D × E)⊤, it induces an ‘action’ taking closures on
D⊤ to closures on E⊤, α 7→ α;σ, and a ‘coaction’ taking closures on E⊤ back to closures
on D⊤, β 7→ σ;β. E.g. σ;β(x) = pi1 ◦ σ(x, y), where y = 〈pi2 ◦ σ(x,−)|β〉.
Now we can define
SO(A⊗B) = {σ : (D(A) ×D(B))⊤ | ∀α ∈ SP (A). α;σ ∈ SO(B)
∧ ∀β ∈ SP (B). σ;β ∈ SO(A)}.
Again, by De Morgan duality,
AOB = (A⊥ ⊗B⊥)⊥, A⊸ B = A⊥OB.
In particular,
SP (A⊸ B) = {σ : (D(A) ×D(B))⊤ | ∀α ∈ SP (A). α;σ ∈ SP (B)
∧ ∀β ∈ SO(B). σ;β ∈ SO(A)}.
This is a symmetric, ‘classical’ version of the familiar logical relations condition: σ’s action
carries P strategies on A to P strategies on B, and its coaction carries counter-strategies
on B to counter-strategies on A.
7.3. Connection with Geometry of Interaction
As to the issue of faithfully reflecting geometry of interaction ideas in modelling the mul-
tiplicatives, we recall that the basic idea in geometry of interaction is that multiplicative
proofs are modelled by permutations. Note that in any symmetric monoidal category,
the symmetric group S(n) acts in a canonical way on the tensor power
n⊗
A = A⊗ . . .⊗A︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
In the original form of Geometry of Interaction (Girard 1989) (dubbed ‘particle style GoI’
in (Abramsky 1996)), the monoidal structure used for the representation is coproduct
(disjoint union). In our setting, we can use products to exactly the same effect. Thus in
our example of the sequent
α⊥Oα⊥, α⊗ α
the two proofs can be represented as maps on a product
D ×D ×D ×D
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by
(a, b, c, d) 7→ (c, d, a, b)
for the identity, and
(a, b, c, d) 7→ (d, c, b, a)
for the twist.
This idea, although basically correct, requires a slight elaboration in order to mesh
with our approach of using closure operators to model strategies. We turn permutations
σ as above into closure operators γ by defining
γ(x) = x ∨ σ(x).
Thus for example the permutation corresponding to the identity as above will give rise
to the closure operator
(a, b, c, d) 7→ (a ∨ c, b ∨ d, c ∨ a, d ∨ b).
The axiom α⊥, α is interpreted by the twist map on D ×D
(x, y) 7→ (y, x)
and then by the closure
(x, y) 7→ (x ∨ y, x ∨ y)
which forces the pair (x, y) to the least element above it in the product D×D which lies
on the diagonal (and to ⊤ if x and y have no upper bound in D).
In this fashion, we can claim to have achieved our objective of faithfully embedding
both the Blass games treatment of the additives, and the GoI treatment of the multi-
plicatives, within our model.
7.4. Connection with ‘New Foundations’
It should be noted that mathematically, the concurrent games model is merely a rephras-
ing of the ‘New Foundations for the Geometry of Interaction’ introduced by the present
author and Radha Jagadeesan in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994a). As demonstrated
in (Abramsky 1996; Abramsky et al. 2002), this and the original form of geometry of
interaction in (Girard 1989) are indeed both instances of a single general scheme, as far
as the interpretation of the multiplicatives and exponentials are concerned. However, as
already emphasized in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994a), the New Foundations setting
has the representational capacity to capture the causality inherent in the additives, which
the ‘particle style’ GoI of (Girard 1989) does not. The advantage of the presentation of
concurrent games in terms of closure operators is that the connection with traditional
forms of game semantics, and Blass games in particular, becomes much clearer. However,
the New Foundations presentation remains important, particularly since we can use it to
pick out those strategies satisfying significant domain-theoretic properties such as sta-
bility and sequentiality, which turn out to be important for full completeness, i.e. for
characterizing which strategies arise from proofs. These properties apply to the underly-
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ing NFGoI functions f , rather than to the closure operators σ they induce via
σ(x) = x ∨ f(x).
For example, as already explained in the previous section, we interpret axioms by the
closure
(x, y) 7→ (x ∨ y, x ∨ y)
which is certainly not a stable function; however, its underlying NFGoI function is the
twist map, which of course is stable.
It is also worth pointing out to readers with a concurrency background that the New
Foundations interpetation can be understood operationally in terms of a simple dataflow
model, as described in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994a). We have already pointed
out the connection to concurrent constraints, which can be seen as a generalization of
dataflow. (In fact, the first use of closure operators in the semantics of concurrency was
for the semantics of a dataflow language with logic variables (Jagadeesan et al. 1989)).
7.5. Composition revisited
We now illustrate how the concurrent games model overcomes the problem with compo-
sition which arises with Blass games, with reference to the example discussed in section 4.
For illustration, we fix the interpretation of α to be the game B = I ⊕ I, where
I = (1, {id1}, {id1})
the one-point domain in which no moves are possible (i.e. the sole point is the root of
the game tree), and in which the identity function is a valid strategy for both P and O.
Note that B can be seen as a type of ‘booleans’:
D(B) = (1 ⊎ 1)⊥ =
tt ff
·
✲
✛
the flat domain of booleans, with
SP (B) = {intt, inff} S
O(B) = {idB}
where for b ∈ {tt, ff}
inb(⊥) = inb(b) = b, inb(b
′) = ⊤ (b 6= b′).
We can now compute the underlying domains of the sequents:
D(α⊥ ⊕ α⊥, α⊕ α) = D((α⊥ ⊕ α⊥)O(α⊕ α))
= (B ⊎ B)⊥ × (B ⊎ B)⊥
= D(α⊥&α⊥, α&α).
Although these domains are identical, if we take account of the polarities on the addi-
tive connectives, which are reflected in the definitions of the sets of strategies for the
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corresponding games, we can distinguish between them. For example,
D(α⊥ ⊕ α⊥) = •
✲
✛
•
✲
✛
◦
✲
✛
Here the nodes marked • are where O is to move, and hence must be fixpoints for all
P-strategies; and conversely for the ◦-node.
We now consider the interpretations of the three proofs discussed in section 4. Firstly,
c = JΠ1K has the definition
c(⊥,⊥) = (intt(⊥), intt(⊥))
c(intt(x), intt(y)) = (intt(x ∨ y), intt(x ∨ y))
c(inff(x), y) = c(x, inff(y)) = ⊤.
Note that Π3, the proof which introduces the two occurrences of ⊕ in the opposite order,
has the same denotation JΠ3K = e = c; in both cases, the two introductions (or: choices
at the ⊕-nodes) are performed concurrently.
Finally d = JΠ2K has the definition
d(x,⊥) = (x,⊥) d(⊥, y) = (⊥, y)
d(ini(x), inj(y)) = (ini(x ∨ y), inj(x ∨ y)).
Again, this has the same denotation as the proof which introduces the two &’s in the
opposite order. (However, it should be noted that in general, strategies must be taken
modulo partial equivalence relations as in (Abramsky and Mellie`s 1999) in order to ob-
tain the unicity properties for product and coproduct (i.e. the commutative conversions in
sequent calculus terms, or η-conversions in λ-calculus terminology). Interestingly, partial
equivalence relations are also needed in Ludics (Girard 2001)).
Now one can check, unfolding the definitions, that
c; (d; e) = c = e = (c; d); e.
For example, the fixpoint in c; d converges after two iterations, with the resulting be-
haviour
(c; d)(⊥,⊥) = (intt(⊥),⊥)
(c; d)(intt(x), inj(y)) = (intt(x ∨ y), inj(x ∨ y)).
This strategy, of type
α⊥ ⊕ α⊥, α&α
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exemplifies how global polarization no longer holds in the concurrent games model. Both
P and O can move initially, P to make the choice at the ⊕, O to make the choice at the
&. After these choices have been made (determining an axiom link in the corresponding
proof net) a copy-cat is then played between the chosen occurrences of the atom. See
(Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994a) for many examples of such fixpoint computations,
and a detailed analysis of the correspondence with cut elimination.
Thus when we compose in either order, (c; d); e or c; (d; e), the result is the same; P is
no longer blocked by polarization constraints from making the choices at both occurrences
of ⊕—truly concurrently.
7.6. A more concrete presentation
The foregoing mathematical development may have seemed abstract, and hard to relate to
one’s intuitions. Let us start again, and give an essentially equivalent, but more concrete
presentation.
Our notion of concurrent games can be thought of as played between two ‘teams’ of
players, distributed around the ‘game board’, in an aynchronous fashion.
The basic action in a game is making a move, which is chosen from among several
possible alternatives. The information content of the move is the choice or decision as to
which move to play.
We fix a set C of ‘cells’ as labels for the various choices or decisions that have to be
made during the course of a play of the game, and a set V of ‘values’, enumerating the
possible choices. So the ‘event’ (c, v) means that alternative v was chosen at cell c. A state
of the game board—a position of the game—is then represented by a partial function
from cells to values
{(c1, v1), . . . , (ck, vk)}
(so there is no information about the order in which decisions were taken).
We can take C = V = N for a ‘universal’ choice of game board, into which any other
(subject to countability) can be embedded. The positions are then partial functions on
natural numbers, which under inclusion form one of the basic examples of a domain
(Abramsky and Jung 1994). Moreover, as play progresses, and more moves are made,
the position increases in the natural information ordering:
{(c1, v1), (c2, v2)}
(c3,v3)
−→ {(c1, v1), (c2, v2), (c3, v3)}.
Call this universal game board G.
A strategy is a function
f : G −→ G.
For the reasons already explained in the previous section, this function should be mono-
tonic and continuous, increasing (x ⊆ f(x)), and idempotent (f(f(x)) = f(x)).
What about unreachable positions? We need an ‘error element’ ⊤ for situations when
the strategy is applied to a position which could never have been reached if we had been
following that strategy. To preserve the increasingness property, this error element must
be top in the information ordering. So a strategy is a continuous closure operator on the
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complete lattice G⊤ obtained by adjoining a top element to G. The set of all such closure
operators
S = Cl(G⊤)
is our universal space of strategies.
Various sub-classes of S are important. In particular, there are constraints on strategies
which correspond to important computational properties. One of these is sequentiality
(Curien 1986).
A closure operator σ ∈ S has an output function f : G→ G if
∀x ∈ dom(σ). σ(x) = f(x) ∨ x
where
dom(σ) = {x ∈ G | σ(x) 6= ⊤}.
We recall the domain-theoretic conditions of stability and sequentiality (Amadio and Curin 1998).
These make sense because our underlying domain G is simple and concrete—it is in fact
a ‘concrete domain’ in the technical sense of Kahn and Plotkin (Kahn and Plotkin 1993).
Indeed, because it is simply a (countable) product of flat domains (in fact, G = N⊥
ω),
we can use Vuillemin’s original definition of sequentiality (Vuillemin 1973): a function
f : G→ G is sequential if:
∀c ∈ C. ∀x ∈ G. f(x)(c)↑ ⇒ ∀y ⊇ x. f(y)(c)↑
∨ (∃c′. x(c′)↑ ∧ ∀y ⊇ x. f(y)(c)↓ ⇒ y(c′)↓).
This says that there is some particular cell in the input which must get filled before we
can fill the given output cell. Classically, this condition excludes the parallel-or function,
Berry’s ‘Gustave function’, etc. (Vuillemin 1973; Kahn and Plotkin 1993; Curien 1986).
We take the ‘constraint’ of having a sequential output function as picking out those
strategies which are to be regarded as computing in a deterministic fashion, and hence
sequentially implementable. In support of this contention, we have the fact that, when
we make our universe of sequential strategies into a model for a sequential functional lan-
guage such as PCF (an elegant way of doing this is to use realizability ideas (Abramsky 2000)),
then it is fully abstract, and even universal if we restrict to effective strategies.
It is interesting to contrast this with Longley’s use of realizability to characterize the
strongly stable model of Bucciarelli and Ehrhard (Longley 1998). Longley’s combinatory
algebra of realizers has the domain G as its carrier, and can be seen as a ‘coded’ version
of Berry-Curien sequential algorithms (Curien 1986); whereas we use the domain of se-
quential functions on G as our carrier, with application defined as in NFGoI, to realize
the fully abstract model.
Let us give a first indication of how we can use our simple universal (type-free) space
of strategies to recover the same structure we displayed in a typed version in the previous
section.
We split the ‘address space’ by fixing
C = C1 ⊎C2
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(C1, C2 infinite). Note that
G = V C⊥ = V
C1+C2
⊥
∼= V C1⊥ × V
C2
⊥
∼= G×G.
So we can regard any σ ∈ S as
σ : G×G −→ G ×G.
The most basic example of a strategy is the asynchronous copy-cat :
id(x, y) = (x ∨ y, x ∨ y).
The corresponding output function is the twist map:
tw(x, y) = (y, x)
since
(x ∨ y, x ∨ y) = (x, y) ∨ (y, x).
7.7. The process model
This may still be too abstract for some. We can also describe the model in operational
terms with a little process calculus.
We define a syntax of terms by the BNF
P ::= c?x→ P | c!e | P‖Q | 0 | ⊤ | (νc)P | X | recX.P | . . .
We define a structural congruence on these terms in the style of the (asynchronous)
pi-calculus (Milner 1999). The main novel feature is that ⊤ acts as a zero, and we have
c!v1 ‖ c!v2 ≡ ⊤ (v1 6= v2).
We can then define a reduction semantics, again in the style of the pi-calculus, but with
one key difference: we have the reduction
c!v ‖ (c?x→ P ) −→ c!v ‖P [v/x]
where in CCS or the pi-calculus we would have the rule
c!v ‖ (c?x→ P ) −→ P [v/x].
This property of persistence of outputs (which corresponds to the information increas-
ingness in the domain-theoretic presentation) is more akin to concurrent constraint pro-
gramming (Saraswat 1993).
We can connect this operational view very directly to our view of strategies as closure
operators by defining a denotational semantics for terms of our process calculus as closure
operators, and proving a correspondence between this denotational semantics and the
operational semantics. We can then see the process calculus terms as providing a syntax
for our semantic objects, and moreover making the computational behaviour of strategies
explicit via the associated operational semantics.
Sequentiality vs. Concurrency in Games and Logic 29
We give a couple of clauses for this denotational semantics.
[[c?x→ P ]](a) =
{
a, a(c)↑
[[P [v/x]]](a), a(c) = v
[[c!v]](a) =
{
a ∪ {(c, v)} if consistent
⊤ otherwise
Parallel composition is interpreted as the join of closure operators; note the connection
to the composition operators defined in Section 5.
[[P‖Q]] =
∨
k∈ω
([[P ]] ◦ [[Q]])k =
∨
k∈ω
([[Q]] ◦ [[P ]])k.
Applied to any a, this gives the least common fixpoint of P and Q above a. Note that it
doesn’t matter who starts!
Using this calculus, we can construct the copy-cat strategy described previously as
an abstract closure operator in more concrete terms as a process. (We use the splitting
of the address space introduced in the previous section. For each cell c, we think of it
occurring once in the ‘left part’ of the address space, C1, as l(c), and once in the right
part C2, as r(c)). Now we can define the ‘copy-cat process’ as:
id = ‖c∈C (l(c)?x→ r(c)!x ‖ r(c)?x→ l(c)!x).
We can think of this process as a big team of players, one for each matched pair of cells.
This process copies the contents of either element of the pair into the other as soon as
it is filled. Of course, if the pair of cells have incompatible contents, then this will fail.
However, if we play this copy-cat strategy against any other strategy following the type
constraints of Linear Logic, then this kind of failure can never happen.
8. Full Completeness
The usual notion of completeness for a logic is with respect to provability; Full Com-
pleteness is with respect to proofs.
Let M be a model of the formulas and proofs of a logic L. Typically this means that
M is a category with structure of an appropriate kind, such that the formulas of L denote
objects of M, proofs Π in L of entailments A ⊢ B denote morphisms
[[Π]] : [[A]] −→ [[B]],
and the convertibility of proofs in L with respect to cut-elimination is soundly modelled
by the equations between morphisms holding inM. We say that M is fully complete for
L if for all formulas A, B of L, every morphism f : [[A]] → [[B]] in M is the denotation
of some proof Π of A ⊢ B in L: f = [[Π]]. Thus the full completeness of M means that it
characterizes ‘what it is to be a proof in L’ in a very strong sense. If M is defined in a
syntax-independent way, this is a true semantic characterization of the ‘space’ of proofs
spanned by L.
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The notion of Full Completeness was introduced in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b)‡,
and a Full Completeness theorem was proved for a game semantics of Multiplicative Lin-
ear Logic (with the MIX rule). This was followed by a series of papers which established
full completeness results for a variety of models with respect to various versions of Multi-
plicative Linear Logic, e.g. (Hyland and Ong 1992; Blute and Scott 1996; Loader 1994a;
Loader 1994b; Tan 1997; Devarajan et al. 1999; Haghverdi 2000).
The proofs of full completeness which have appeared to date fall into two broad classes:
— Proofs using decomposition arguments
— ‘Geometric’ proofs via proof nets.
The first class of proofs is based on the ‘last rule = first move’ idea. One decomposes
a (sequential) strategy into an opening move, or an initial P-response to an opening O-
move, and some sub-strategies. The initial protocol is matched with a sequent calculus
rule, or a term formation scheme in a λ-calculus setting. One then recursively applies the
decomposition to the sub-strategies, uncovering the sequent proof or term which denotes
the strategy step by step.
This is typical of the proofs of definability and full completeness which have been given
for a range of λ-calculus based programming languages (Abramsky and McCusker 1999;
Abramsky 2000a), and for various fragments of Intuitionistic Logic and Intuitionistic
Linear Logic (Murawski and Ong 1999; Murawski and Ong 2000), and also applies,modo
grosso, to the full completeness proof for Ludics with respect to MALLfoc (Girard 2001).
This form of proof is obviously well-adapted to sequential models.
By contrast, the second class of proof, beginning with the original full completeness
result in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b), first establishes a connection beteen the
semantic objects (in our case, strategies) and proof structures, or ‘pre-proofs’; and then
shows that the ‘geometric’ constraints picking out those structures which are proof nets,
i.e which correspond to real proofs, must be satisfied by the proof structures arising from
the semantic objects.
The first step typically uses uniformity arguments of a fairly general nature, while the
second step makes more delicate use of specific features of the model.
The full completeness proof for concurrent games with respect to MALL (AM98;
Abramsky and Mellie`s 1999) is of this general form. The connection made is with the
proof nets for MALL introduced in (Girard 1995), which eliminate additive boxes in
favour of boolean weights, which distribute information about causal dependencies around
the proof net. An important point is that what seemed to be mere technical machinery in
(Girard 1995) acquires a much clearer semantic status in the full completeness argument.
In particular, the boolean weights are derived from inherent functional (or, in process
‡ There were a number of significant precursors, as noted in (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b), in-
cluding representation theorems in category theory (Freyd and Scedrov 1991), full abstraction results
in programming language semantics (Milner 1975; Plotkin 1977), Plotkin’s characterization of defin-
ability in the λ-calculus using logical relations (Plotkin 1980), studies of parametric polymorphism
(Bainbridge et al. 1990; Hyland et al. 1989), and the completeness conjecture in (Girard 1991). How-
ever, the contribution of (Abramsky and Jagadeesan 1994b) was to clearly identify and formulate this
issue as a precise and interesting research programme, and to prove the first in what has become quite
a rich sequence of results.
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terms: causal) dependencies in the model; and the ‘monomial condition’, which plays a
key technical roˆle in the proof of the Sequentialization Theorem in (Girard 1995), turns
out to correspond exactly to the semantic constraint of stability on the strategies in the
concurrent games model.
We thus have the interesting situation of two rather different proofs: one for the sequen-
tial case (Ludics with respect to MALLfoc) and one for the concurrent case (concurrent
games with respect to MALL). Nevertheless, the scope of the two results is entirely anal-
ogous: both concern the Π1 fragment of MALL resp. MALLfoc, without the multiplicative
units. It is a challenge for further work to relate them.
9. Concluding Remarks
We have sketched two ways out of the structural dilemma which arose with Blass games.
There are good arguments for pursuing both:
— The focussing version of Linear Logic offers more control over proof search (the pur-
pose for which it was originally introduced (Andreoli and Pareschi 1991)), and is a
good setting for studying sequential models of classical systems, analogous to the
λµ-calculus for Classical Logic.
— The concurrent approach allows the direct study of the original system. It is close to
Geometry of Interaction and Proof nets. It may offer a principled way of describing
and controlling true concurrency, just as classical logic may for non-deterministic
computation.
Ultimately, one would hope to relate these two directions in a coherent fashion.
We end with some more specific challenges and questions:
— Both for Ludics and concurrent games, the challenge of extending the full complete-
ness results to the exponentials remains. This may require a better treatment of the
multiplicative units than either currently offers.
— Once the exponentials have been analyzed, one may hope to turn the lens of fully
complete models onto systems which can be interpreted into Linear Logic, notably
Classical logic. One tantalizing question which remains unclear: is there true concur-
rency lurking somewhere in the computational interpretation of classical logic?
— It would also be interesting to look at bounded systems such as Light Linear Logic
(Girard 1998), and the connections to complexity classes.
Appendix: a brief review of MALL
The formulas of the system are built from literals, i.e. propositional atoms α, β, . . . and
their negations α⊥, β⊥, . . . , by the grammar
A ::= α | α⊥ | A⊗A | AOA | A⊕A | A&A.
Here ⊗ and O are the multiplicative connectives, while ⊕, & are the additive connectives.
Negation is definitionally extended to general formulas by the equations
(A⊗B)⊥ = A⊥OB⊥ (AOB)⊥ = A⊥ ⊗B⊥
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(A⊕B)⊥ = A⊥&B⊥ (A&B)⊥ = A⊥ ⊕B⊥
A⊥⊥ = A.
A sequent in MALL is an expression Γ, where Γ is a finite multiset of formulas.
The rules of MALL are as follows.
Axiom/Cut
A,A⊥
Id
Γ, A ∆, A⊥
Γ,∆
Cut
Multiplicatives
Γ, A ∆, B
Γ,∆, A⊗ B
⊗
Γ, A,B
Γ, AOB
O
Additives
Γ, A
ΓA⊕B
⊕L
Γ, B
ΓA⊕B
⊕R
Γ, A Γ, B
Γ, A&B
&
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